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A NOTE ON THE RELATIONSHIP   








This paper empirically traces out the impacts of corruption on government revenue. The 
total amount of government revenue decreases as corruption r educes tax revenues if it 
contributes to tax evasion, improper tax exemptions or weak tax administration. In addition, 
corruption may distort the composition of government revenue: that is, a country with a 
higher level of corruption increases the proportion of international tax revenue rather than 
domestic tax one as the source of government revenue. Using cross-national evidence, it is 
identified that several corruption indices are positively and significantly associated with the 
taxes on international trade over current government revenue. Moreover, corruption is 
negatively and significantly related to the domestic tax revenue as well as total amount of 
government revenue over GDP. 
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1.  I NTRODUCTION 
 
Corruption, defined as the misuse of public office for private gain, has attracted a 
great deal of attention in recent years. In particular, several empirical studies on 
corruption have shown that it is a big impediment to develop for certain developing 
countries. That is, higher perceived corruption lowers the private marginal product of 
capital, which inhibits to investment and growth (e.g., Mauro (1995)). 
In addition to the impact of corruption on the real sector, it may also distort the fiscal 
policies because a corrupt politician (or corrupt public office) may be expected to use his 
or her authority on those activities on which it is easier to collect bribes. For example, 
Mauro (1998) examined the relationship between corruption and the composition of 
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government expenditure, and further he showed that education spending is adversely 
affected by corruption. It is now possible to claim that another plausible distortion from 
corruption relates to the composition of government revenue. Indeed, corruption may 
alter the government revenue into two ways. The first one is the total amount of 
government revenue decreases as corruption reduces tax revenues if it contributes to tax 
evasion, improper tax exemptions or weak tax administration (e.g., Tanzi  (1998) and 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)). While this paper considers the “size effect” of corruption on 
government revenue, it is not the main consideration. Instead, this paper focuses on the 
second issue, which may be regarded with the composition of government revenue or as 
a “distortion effect.” That is, more corrupt countries tend to heavily depend on the taxes 
on international trade rather than domestic taxes as the source of government revenue. 
A number of political international trade literature examined the linkage between 
rent-seeking and trade protection by imposing higher taxes on international trade (e.g., 
Helpman (1995) Mayer (1984) Mitra (1999) and Mueller (1989)). The seminal paper of 
Krueger (1974) addressed that it is the existence of rents to motivate rent-seeking 
behavior. Therefore, corrupt politicians (or corrupt  public office) may use their 
authorities in the way to increase taxes on international trade to exploit for their private 
gains.   
Using cross-country evidence,  it is found that corruption does indeed affect the 
composition of government revenue as well as its total amount.  The taxes on 
international trade  over current government revenue is found to be significantly and 
positively affected by corruption. The impacts on total amount of government revenue 
and tax revenue over GDP are also consistent with a prior expectation: that is, counties 
with the higher levels of corruption may have smaller volumes of government revenue 
and domestic tax revenue. 
The question whether corruption affects government revenue  may  have some 
important implications. First, recent empirical studies on corruption assumed that the 
amount of government revenue is exogenously given, which can be associated with the 
level o f economic development or performance. Hence, we are able to observe  an 
indirect impact of corruption on economic performances through government revenue as 
long as the government revenue is endogenous on corruption. Second, if the proposition 
that corruption distorts the composition of government revenue is true, the distortion 
may affect the income distribution that is a big issue of the fairness in economics. For 
example, Spilimbergo  et al. (1999) examined the effects of several trade openness 
measures on income distribution. If corruption is positively associated with the taxes on 
international trade,  then corruption and the composition of government revenue may 
both individually and jointly affect the  income distribution through trade protection.
1 
 
1 The question whether taxes on international trade can be an appropriate measure of trade protection has 
some problematic issues (see Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999)). However, let us put aside the issue since that is 
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Third, the “distortion effect” of corruption on government revenue applies to the studies 
on corporate finance. For example, a firm with a low ratio of stockholder’s equity to 
total assets may be managed by a corrupt manager (or entrepreneur). The corruption 
between corrupt managers and financial institutions who concern with private gains is to 
make overinvestment in unprofitable projects. For example, Hwang and Wang (2001) 
presented the financial collusion between an entrepreneur and a dishonest auditor, which 
leads to an over-lending to a firm by a bank. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an empirical 
methodology, in which consists of the theoretical background, the data and cross-section 
estimations. Section 3 contains some conclusions and implications. 
 
 
2.  E MPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
A.  Theoretical Background 
 
Recently, the broad studies on corruption have attracted a great deal of attention. The 
first attempt was to find out the impacts of corruption on the real sector.  As  an 
influential work, Mauro (1995) provided that corruption lowers private investment with 
the view that it lowers the private marginal product of capital. In the meantime, Shelifer 
and Vishny (1993) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) showed that an increased corruption is 
associated with a  higher level of public investment in a theoretical and an empirical 
manner, respectively. The overinvestment in the public sector resulted from secrecy 
(Shelifer and Vishny (1993)) and it is combined with a low level of productivity (Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997)). Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) further suggested that corruption 
reduces the incentive to total investment since corruption must reduce private investment 
by more than it increases public investment. 
After that, focuses move to  the impacts of corruption on policy-making. Lack of 
transparency in policy-making can distort fiscal polices (e.g., Tanzi  (1998)). For 
example, Mauro (1998) showed that  predatory behaviors by corrupt politicians distort 
the composition of government expenditure. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) presented the 
distortions of the entire decision-making process connected with public investment 
projects. M ore r ecently, Hindriks  et al. (1999) examined the implications of 
corruptibility and the potential abuse of government authority for the tax collection 
schemes.  However, few attempts have been made to analyze the linkage between 
corruption and the composition of government revenue, which serves the motivation of 
this paper. A smaller number of big potential gainers from international trade have much 
greater incentive to lobby in securing trade protection than a large number of small 
potential losers ( e.g.,  Helpman  (1995), Hwang and Jung  (2002),  Mayer (1984),  and 
Mitra  (1999)). In other word, small rich producers are a greater number of lobbies in JINYOUNG HWANG  164
setting higher taxes on international trade than do large poor consumers.
2 Another 
motivation of this paper is that corruption may reduce tax revenue if it contributes to tax 
evasion, improper tax exemptions or weak tax administration (e.g., Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1997)). Therefore, corruption may contribute to not only the composition of government 
revenue but total amount of government revenue itself. 
 
B.  Data 
 
The empirical analyses are based on cross-country data consisting of 41-66 countries 
for which were largely dictated by the availability of data, such as corruption indices and 
government revenue. Five alternative corruption indices (CI), which represent the 
degrees of corruption or questionable payments in business transactions, are used in this 
paper. It is worthwhile to note that the measurements of CI have significant drawbacks 
since the indices are based on the perceptions rather than objective and qualitative 
measures of actual corruption.
3 
A few different sources of CI  follow. The first source of CI (denoted CI 1 
throughout) is taken from Mauro (1995) who reported the index of  Business 
International, covering 68 countries over the 1980-83 period. The second source of CI 
(CI 2) is from Levine-Loayza-Beck (1999) data set that is averaged over 1982-1995. The 
last three indices are the Transparency International (TI) measures of the corruption in 
1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively (CI 3, CI 4 and CI 5, respectively). The TI measures 
can be acquired from Treisman (2000). All indices range from 0 (least corrupt) to 10 
(most corrupt) and are based on the perceptions drawn from people in multinational 
firms and institutions and provided one observation per country. The summary of 
statistics for five alternative CI is provided in Table 1. It is possible to observe that five 
indices are highly correlated with correlation coefficients of 0.79 - 0.99, which means CI 
are very stationary over time and the units of CI are not really quantitative. 
In estimating the relationship between CI a nd the components of government 
revenue, it is less likely to avoid an endogeneity bias because the corruption indices are 
subjective and based on the perceptions. Indeed, it is possible to claim that the 
components of government revenue or government revenue itself can cause corruption. 
Therefore, three instrumental variables are used to address any potential endogeneity 
bias. The first and second instruments are the percent of population professing protestant 
faith (PP) and  the  former British colony or UK (FBUK), which are drawn from 
 
2 The existence of corruption can be explained by the initial inequalities of income or wealth distributions. 
For instance, the relationship between inequality and the number of organized group, and between inequality 
and rent-seeking are examined by Mitra (1999) and Rodriguez (1999), respectively. On the contrary, the 
positive and significant impacts of corruption on income inequality and poverty are demonstrated on Gupta et 
al. (1998). Therefore, the causation problem between inequality and corruption remains as a controversial 
issue. 
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Treisman (2000).  Data on FBUK is a dummy variable related to whether the country 
ever was a colony of British or UK. Both instrumental  variables are highly correlated 
with CI, perhaps because countries that have high proportion of religious beliefs and 
have been colonized of British or UK have found it is easy to develop efficient 
institutions. The final instrument is an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) 
drawn from Taylor and Hudson (1972), which means a measure of the probability that 
two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same 
ethnolinguistic group. In accordance with Shleifer and Vishny (1993)’s argument, more 
fractionalized countries tend to have more dishonest bureaucracies, and hence ELF can 
be a good instrument. The simple correlation coefficients with CI are 0.29 (CI 2) through 
0.37 (CI 4) and statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
 
 
Table 1.    Statistics for Corruption Indices (CI) 
  CI 1  CI 2  CI 3  CI 4  CI 5 
Mean  2.86  4.06  4.53  4.16  4.72 
Median  2.63  4.70  4.98  4.10  5.10 
Maximum  8.50  9.82  9.00  7.95  8.60 
Minimum  0.00  0.00  0.57  0.06  0.00 
Standard Deviation  2.41  2.72  2.64  2.56  2.49 
Sample Size  52  66  45  41  59 
Correlation Coefficient:           
CI 1  1  0.81  0.86  0.84  0.79 
CI 2  0.81  1  0.91  0.90  0.89 
CI 3  0.86  0.91  1  0.97  0.97 
CI 4  0.84  0.90  0.97  1  0.99 
CI 5  0.79  0.89  0.97  0.99  1 
Sources: CI 1 is the Corruption Index provided by Business International, average 1980-83 (from Mauro (1995)). 
CI 2 is the Corruption Index from Levine-Loayza-Beck (1999) data set that is averaged over 1982-1995. CI 3, CI 
4 and CI  5 are the Corruption Indices provided by  Transparency International  in 1996, 1997 and 1998, 
respectively (from Treisman (2000)). 
 
 
The first purpose of this paper is to consider how the level of corruption may affect 
the total amount of government revenue. Data on government revenue excluding grants 
as a fraction of GDP is used as the measure of total government revenue, which comes 
from the World Bank’s (2000) World Development Indicators  (WDI), and four years 
(1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995) are considered for the analysis. In addition, two 
components of government revenue are considered to see how they are affected by the 
corruption indices. The first  component is t axes on international trade over current 
government revenue, which is used the four years (1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995). Taxes 
on international trade include import duties, export duties, profits of export or import JINYOUNG HWANG  166
monopolies exchange profits, and exchange  taxes (see WDI table 4. 15). Another 
component is the tax revenue over GDP
4 and four years as in the first component are 
used in the analysis. The World Bank (2000) published both data. Table 2 provides the 
summary of statistics for the government revenue and its components’ shares. It can be 
seen that there  is a  wide variation of the data across countries. For example, taxes on 
international trade over government revenue (provided in Column 3) ranges from 0 to 
51.62 percents. In addition, it is possible to observe that both “government revenue over 
GDP” and “tax revenue over GDP” are negatively related to the CI; however, “taxes on 
international trade over current government revenue” is positively associated with CI. 
 
 
Table 2.    Statistics for Government Revenue and Its Components 
  (1) GREV  (2) TR  (3) ITR 
Mean  25.34  21.09  12.95 
Median  23.67  19.44  9.24 
Maximum  54.52  44.89  51.62 
Minimum  4.04  3.85  0.00 
Standard Deviation  10.46  9.12  12.56 
Sample Size  277  279  276 
Correlation Coefficient:       
CI 1  -0.53  -0.58  0.45 
CI 2  0.56  0.61  0.67 
CI 3  0.64  0.64  0.63 
CI 4  0.68  0.65  0.59 
CI 5  0.55  0.59  0.48 
Notes: All data in Table 2 are pooled for four years (1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995).   
The variables are defined as follows:   
GREV: Government Revenue excluding Grants over GDP.   
TR: Tax Revenue over GDP. 
ITR: Taxes on International Trade over Government Revenue. 
Source: World Bank (2000), “World Development Indicators on CD-Rom.”   
 
 
To represent the proxy for the  initial  stage of an economy, real  GDP per capita in 
1979-80 (denoted as GDP80), import volume in 1979-80 and government consumption 
in 1980 are also used as independent variables. The GDP80 is used as a determinant of 
the  government revenue since it represents the initial level of economic development, 
which is the average for the period 1979-80. The different levels of development may 
 
4 Since every country has different governmental and tax system, we use the data on “tax revenue over 
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require different needs for government revenue. Import volume is defined as the ratio of 
imports to GDP and used in the estimations on the ratio of international taxes over 
current government revenue on the belief that an elevated import volume may increase 
the  international tax revenue. Moreover, the initial level of government consumption 
may affect the collection of domestic tax revenue, and hence government consumption 
over GDP in 1980 is used as an independent variable in determining the  tax revenue 
over GDP. General government consumption includes all current spending for purchases 
of goods and services (including wages and salaries) as well as most expenditures on 
national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are 
part of government capital formation (see WDI table 4. 9). The above three independent 
variables are also drawn from the World Bank (2000).   
 
C.  E mpirical Equations and Results 
 
The first empirical task is to identify the effectiveness of instrumental variables for 
CI using the OLS method. The CI function estimated takes the following form: 
 
. ) ( term error X c CI i j i + + = a                                          (1) 
 
Here,  the  subscript  i  denotes countries;  c is a constant;  ) 3 1 ( K = j j a  are  the 
estimated coefficients of the corresponding independent variables; and  X  is a set of 
instrumental variables. We expect that the estimated coefficients of ELF are positive and 
those of PP and FBUK are negative signs. The estimation results on the determinants of 
corruption are provided in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3.   Determinants of Corruption 
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2  0.37  0.34  0.51  0.66  0.55 
Sample Size  51  57  43  40  55 
Notes: 1) The variables are defined as follows: 
CI: Corruption Indices (see Table 1). 
PP: Percentage of Protestant Faith (Treisman (2000)). 
ELF: Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (Taylor and Hudson (1972)). 
FBUK: Former British Colony or UK (Treisman (2000)). 
2) Column numbers refer to different regressions using different corruption indices. 3) t-statistics are in 
parentheses based on the White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. 4) 
*(
 ** , 
*** ) 
indicates significance at 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
 
 
The regression results indicate that a higher level of corruption is positively 
associated with ELF and negatively associated with PP and FBUK.
5 Except the 
estimated coefficient of FBUK on CI 2, all estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at the conventional levels. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that countries 
with protestant traditions and histories of former colony or UK were less corrupt. On the 
country, more ethnolinguistically-fractionalized countries were more corrupt. 
To identify the impacts of corruption on the ratio of government revenue excluding 
grants to GDP (GREV), four years of GREV are separately regressed on the CI and 
GDP80 using the OLS method. The GREV regression takes the following form: 
 
term error CI GDP c GREV i i it + + + = ) ( ) 80 ( ) ( b a .                         (2) 
 
Here, subscripts  i  and  t  denote countries and time periods (1980, 1985, 1990 and 
1995), respectively;  c  is a constant;  a   and  b  are the estimated coefficients of the 
corresponding independent variables. Of particular interest in (2) is the estimated 
coefficient of  b , which shows whether government revenue is affected by the indices 
of corruption. The expectation is a negative sign, implying that a country with a higher 
level of corruption  has a smaller volume of government revenue. The estimated 
coefficient  a   suggests how the initial level of GDP per capita affects the total amount 




5 Mauro (1998) and Treisman (2000) provided a number of determinants of corruption index beyond the 
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Table 4.    Corruption and Government Revenue 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Government Revenue Excluding Grants to GDP (GREV) 
  Dependent 
Variable 
Constant  GDP80  CI 1  CI 2  CI 5  R
2  Sample 
Size 













































































































































































Notes: 1) GREV 80, 85, 90 and 95 are government revenue in 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995, respectively. 2) 
GDP80 is the average of GDP per capita (PPP estimated) in 1979 and 1980, and the coefficients of GDP80 
are multiplied by 10000. 3) t-statistics are in parentheses based on the White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and covariance. 4) 
*(
 ** , 
*** ) indicates significance at 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
 
 
Table 4 contains the results on the relationship between CI and government revenue. 
It shows that GREV is negatively and significantly associated with CI.
6 The magnitude 
 
6 It is not provided the results using CI 3 and CI 4 to beautify the Tables 4, 5 and 7. However, the results 
using CI 3 and CI 4, which have smaller sample sizes than others, are not different from those using CI 1, CI 
2 and CI 5, which are available upon request from the author. JINYOUNG HWANG  170
of the coefficient is considerable; that is, a worsening in transparency (i.e., an increasing 
in CI 1) of a country by one standard deviation (2.41 points on a scale of 0 to 10) would 
lead to decrease in the GREV of about 3.35 (1990 and 1995) through 5.13 (1985) 
percentage points.  The results remain for other corruption indices at the conventional 
significance levels and are robust to the inclusion of GDP80. However, the impacts of 
GDP per capita in 1979-80  on GREV  provide little evidence. Therefore, GREV is 
determined by political motivations such as rent-seeking rather than the level of 
economic development. 
It is worthwhile to note that corruption is not the only determinant  on the 
government revenue. For example, in most developing countries, nonbudgetary funds 
are a common feature due to earmarking and underdeveloped government accounting 
system, which are basically hard to observe and differentiate across countries. 
Now, the analysis will determine whether CI influences the components of 
government revenue, such as taxes on international trade over current government 
revenue (ITR) and tax revenue over GDP (TR). Specifically, ITR regression takes the 
following form:   
 
. ) ( ) ( term error IMV CI c ITR i i it + + + = b a                                (3) 
 
Here, subscripts  i  and  t  denote countries and time periods, respectively;  c  is a 
constant;  a   and  b  are the estimated coefficients of the corresponding independent 
variables; and IMV is the import volume that is the average for the period 1979-80. In 
estimating (3), two econometric methods will be used, those being OLS and Two-Stage 
Least Square (TSLS). 
It is natural to assume that error terms in each period in (3) are correlated to each 
other. For example, a shock affecting ITR for the year 1980 may spill over and affect 
ITR for the year 1985 or other years. Hence, the regression proceeds in the  SURE 
(Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation) method by combining all periods, and all 
regressions are based on a fixed-effect regression model. The ITR regression for the 
panel estimation takes the following form: 
 
95 90 85 80 4 3 2 1 DY c DY c DY c DY c ITR i + + + =  
 
      i i i i DY CI DY CI DY CI DY CI ) 95 ( ) 90 ( ) 85 ( ) 80 ( 4 3 2 1 ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + a a a a  
 
      . ) ( term error IMS i + + b                                         (4) 
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represents a time dummy for the year 1980 (1985, 1990 and 1995);
7  ) 4 1 ( K = j j a  are 
the estimated coefficients of corruption indices and  b  is that of import volume in 
1979-80. 
The empirical results on the impacts of CI on ITR, which are provided in Tables 5 
and 6, are consistent with a prior expectation. In Table 5, the estimated coefficients of CI 
are positive and statistically significant at one percent significance level, which implies 
that more corrupt countries tend to heavily depend on the taxes on international trade for 
their source of government revenue. In Columns (2), (4) and (6), PP, ELF and FBUK are 
used as the instrumental variables for CI. The  estimated coefficients of the CI remain 
broadly unchanged when using a number of different sources of the indices and 
instrumental variables. In addition, it is found that import volume in 1979-80 is 
positively and significantly related to the ITR at the conventional levels. This result 
implies that a country with a larger volume of imports collects significantly g reater 
revenue from the taxes on international trade. 
 
 
Table 5.  International Tax Revenue and Corruption 
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2  0.20  0.17  0.45  0.44  0.30  0.29 
Sample Size  196  196  191  191  210  210 
Notes: 1) Instrumental variables in TSLS are constant, import volume (1979-80), PP, ELF and FBUK (refer 
to the bottom of Table 3 for notations).  2)  t-statistics are in parenthesis based on the White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. 3) 
*(
 ** , 
*** ) indicates significance at 10% (5%, 
1%) level. 
 
7 Note that CI*DY80 (85, 90 and 95) is the product of CI and the time dummy for the year 1980 (1985, 
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It is possible to suspect that the above results are generally derived from the fact that 
the level of economic development affects the degree of corruption. To reduce such a 
serious causation problem, an attempt is made to estimate the same regressions using a 
small sample of developing countries.
8  The results on CI 2, CI 3 and CI 4 are very 
similar to those of the full sample with a bit reduced significances, whereas the 
estimated coefficients of CI 1 and CI 5 are statistically insignificant. The different 
impacts among corruption indices  in developing countries  may be derived from 
relatively great variations among corruption indices and a small sample size. That is, the 
correlation coefficient between CI 1 and CI 2 is 0.81 in the full sample (see Table 1), but 
that in the small sample of developing countries is 0.53 (N = 23). Therefore, it is able to 
roughly observe that  CI are positively associated with ITR in developing countries. 
Particularly, the results using CI 2, CI 3 and CI 4 are  robust to those using the full 
sample. 
The results of the panel estimation on ITR using the  SURE method are illustrated in 
Table 6. All estimated coefficients of CI are positive and significant, which is consistent 
with the results using the OLS and TSLS methods. That is, the results certify the positive 
association between CI and ITR. In other words, a worsening in the corruption (i.e., an 
increasing in CI 5) of a country by one standard deviation (2.49 points on a scale of 0 to 
10) is associated with an increase in the ITR of about 4.83 (CI￿DY85) through 6.05 
(CI￿DY80)  percentage points per year (Column (5) in Table 6). The estimated 
coefficients of import volume are now statistically insignificant,
9  which  implies  that 
ITR can be determined by corruption rather than import volume. 
 
 
Table 6.  Panel Estimation for International Tax Revenue and Corruption 
Dependent Variable: Taxes on International Trade Over Current Government Revenue (ITR) 
Independent   
Variables 
(1)   
CI 1 
(2)   
CI 2 
(3)   
CI 3 
(4)   
CI 4 
(5)   
CI 5 
DY80  3.81  3.59  4.14  1.16  0.17 
DY85  2.58  3.03  4.97  2.09  0.21 
DY90  1.78  2.29  5.46  2.81  1.63 
DY95  2.12  0.44  5.21  2.57  3.50 



































8 It is not provided the results  using a small sample of developing countries as any form of table. The 
reason is that the results are derived from a quite small sample size, which dissuades to believe them. 
9 In Table 6, the estimated coefficient of import volume (1979-80) is statistically significant at ten percent 
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Table 6.  (Continued) 
Independent   
Variables 
(1)   
CI 1 
(2)   
CI 2 
(3)   
CI 3 
(4)   
CI 4 
(5)   
CI 5 
















































2  0.22  0.46  0.44  0.37  0.28 
Panel Observations  198  216  168  155  219 
Notes: 1) SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation) method is used for estimations. 2) Column 
numbers refer to different regressions using different corruption indices denoted in the first row. 3) DY80 (85, 90 
and 95) and CI ￿  DY80 (85, 90 and 95) denote the multiplication between constant and time dummy, and 
between corruption index and time dummy for the year 1980 (1985, 1990 and 1995, respectively). 4) Import 
Volume is the average of two years in parenthesis. 5) t-statistics are provided in parentheses. 6) 
*(
 ** , 
*** ) 
indicates significance at 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
 
 
Finally, the TR function estimated takes the following form, which is basically very 
similar to (3) and (4). 
 
. ) ( ) ( term error GC CI c TR i i it + + + = b a                                  (5) 
 
Here, GC denotes the government consumption in 1980.  We expect a negative 
impact of CI on the TR, meaning that a country with a higher level of corruption has a 
relatively  lower volume of domestic tax revenue. Moreover, a  positive impact of the 
initial level of government consumption on the TR can be anticipated. 
In the same way, the panel estimation for TR using  the  SURE  method  with a 
fixed-effect is represented as follows: 
 
95 90 85 80 4 3 2 1 DY c DY c DY c DY c TR i + + + =  
 
     i i i i DY CI DY CI DY CI DY CI ) 95 ( ) 90 ( ) 85 ( ) 80 ( 4 3 2 1 ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + a a a a  
 
     . ) ( term error GC i + + b                                           (6) 
 
Tables 7 and 8 provide the empirical results on the impacts of CI on TR. It is found 
that there exists a  negative and significant association between CI and TR. This implies 
that more corrupt countries tend to have smaller domestic tax revenues as the source of 
government revenue. In other words, corruption may contribute to tax evasion, improper JINYOUNG HWANG  174
tax exemptions or weak tax administration. The results are robust for various corruption 
indices, to two different econometric methods (OLS and TSLS) and to the inclusion of 
government consumption in 1980. It is worthwhile to note that if corruption increases 
tax evasion and tax collection costs, government can rely on the inflation tax as a source 
of the government revenue. The positive and significant relationship between corruption 
and inflation was provided in Al-Marhubi (2000). Moreover, the estimated coefficients 
of government consumption show that it is positively and significantly (at one percent 
significance level) associated with TR. It means that a country with a greater volume of 
government consumption collects a larger volume of tax revenue. In Table 7, an increase 
in government consumption over GDP in 1980 of a country by one standard deviation 
(6.08 points) would lead to an increase in the TR of about  3.10 percentage points 
(Column (2)) through 4.26 percentage points (Column (4)) per year after accounting the 
effect of corruption. 
 
 
Table 7.  Tax Revenue and Corruption 
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2  0.44  0.44  0.52  0.51  0.46  0.44 
Sample Size  193  193  193  193  206  206 
Notes: 1) Instrumental variables in TSLS are constant, government consumption (1980), PP, ELF and FBUK 
(refer to the bottom of Table 3 for notations).  2)  t-statistics are in parentheses based on the White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. 3) 
*(
 ** , 




The panel estimation u sing the  SURE method, provided in Table 8 , presents very 
similar results as in the Table 7. That is, the signs are exactly the same, and the sizes of 
coefficients and the significances of those are very close to each other, which provides 
another piece of  evidence on the linkage between  CI and TR. Certainly, corruption 
significantly reduces TR and the result is robust to the inclusion of the initial level of A NOTE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE  175
government consumption. A worsening in the corruption (i.e., an increasing in CI 2) of a 
country by one standard deviation (2.72 points on a scale of 0 to 10) is associated with a 
decrease in the TR of about 3.37 (in 1980) through 4.98 (in 1990) percentage points 
(Column (2) in Table 8) per year after accounting the effect of government consumption 
in 1980. The estimated coefficients of government consumption in 1980 are also robust 
to the results of  the  OLS and TSLS methods: that is, it is positively and significantly 
associated with the TR. 
 
 
Table 8.   Panel Estimation for Tax Revenue and Corruption 
Dependent Variable: Tax Revenue Over GDP (TR) 












DY80  14.21  16.82  20.45  21.37  23.30 
DY85  16.24  18.27  22.28  23.64  24.63 
DY90  15.32  19.10  21.63  23.06  25.09 
DY95  15.85  19.25  21.08  22.59  24.52 






















































































2  0.45  0.49  0.47  0.48  0.41 
Panel Observations  195  218  164  151  215 
Notes: 1) SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation) method is used for estimations. 2) Column 
numbers refer to different regressions using different corruption indices denoted in the first row. 3) DY80 (85, 90 
and 95) and CI ￿ DY80 (85, 90 and 95) denotes the multiplication between constant and time dummy, and 
between corruption index and time dummy for the year 1980 (1985, 1990 and 1995, respectively). 4) t-statistics 
are provided in parentheses. 5) 
*(
 ** , 
*** ) indicates significance at 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
 
 
In short, it is possible to conclude that corruption may reduce the government 
revenue as it contributes to reduce the tax revenue over GDP. In addition, a country with 
a higher level of corruption imposes greater taxes on international trade as a source of 
the government revenue. The distortions may be derived from the fact that corrupt 
politicians (or corrupt public office) use their authorities to the activities on which it is JINYOUNG HWANG  176
easier to levy bribes (or side-payments). The results are robust to the inclusions of real 
GDP per capita, government consumption and import volume for several estimations. 
 
 
3.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Since most empirical studies on corruption assumed that the amount of government 
revenue is exogenously given, it is difficult to find out the impacts of corruption on 
economic performances through government revenue. Using cross-country evidence, 
this paper examines the relationship between corruption and government revenue. It is 
found that corruption inversely affects both (i) total amount of government revenue 
excluding grants over GDP and (ii) tax revenue over GDP, and it is significantly and 
positively associated with the taxes on international trade over current government 
revenue. A possible interpretation of the observed association between corruption and 
the distortion of government revenue is that corrupt  governments find it is easier to 
collect bribes on some activities than on others.   
A number of issues remain for future study. This paper is focused on the distortions 
from corruption and not on solutions. It will be an interesting subject to find out the 
solutions of the problems derived from corruption for future study. Another plausible 
extension of this paper is to trace out the individual and joint effects of corruption and 
government revenue on income  distribution in the same regression. Although the 
causation between corruption and income inequality is a controversial issue, corruption 
may change income distribution since rent-seeking is accompanied by well-organized 
interest groups. Moreover, we can apply the analysis of this paper to the corporate 
finance. As corruption affects the composition of government revenue, corrupt managers 
(or entrepreneurs) may heavily depend on an external finance (e.g., borrowing) rather 
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